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INTRODUCTION 
That the use of technology has radically changed the legal 
profession is beyond dispute.1 Through technology, lawyers can 
now represent clients in faraway states and countries, and they 
can represent even local clients through a “virtual law office.”2 
Gone are the times in which the lawyer’s choices for 
communicating with clients primarily involve preparing formal 
business letters to convey advice, holding in-person client 
meetings in the office, or conducting telephone calls with clients 
on landlines from the confines of the lawyer’s office. Not only do 
lawyers have choices about how to communicate with their clients, 
but they also frequently choose electronic modes of 
communication.3 
                                                                                                             
 1 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 3-4 (2012) 
[hereinafter INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW], available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdutio
n_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 2 For a definition of a “virtual law office,” see Jordana Hausman, Who’s Afraid of 
the Virtual Lawyers? The Role of Legal Ethics in the Growth and Regulation of Virtual 
Law Offices, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 577-78 (2012). According to Hausman, a 
virtual law office differs from a traditional law firm with an Internet presence in that 
the virtual law office utilizes an on-line portal maintained by a third party and 
accessed via the Internet to communicate with the client and store the client’s 
confidential information. Id.; see also Letter from ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 
Working Grp. on the Implications of New Techs., to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns 
(state, local, specialty and int’l), Law Schs., Individuals, and Entities (Sept. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter Client Confidentiality Issues Paper], available at http:// www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/work_product
.html. The on-line portal is often referred to as “cloud computing,” and often uses 
technology known as “software as a service.” Id. 
 3 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 4. The ABA report described the 
prevalence of technology as follows: 
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Though using technology for client communications is 
typically faster and often more convenient than traditional modes 
of communication, a lawyer’s ethical obligations impact whether 
or how to use technology.4 The use of technology impacts three of 
the lawyer’s most fundamental obligations–the lawyer’s duties to 
communicate with the client, to protect the confidentiality of that 
communication, and to provide competent representation.5 For 
those reasons, whether a lawyer’s use of technology comports with 
the lawyer’s ethical requirements has been the source of 
numerous ethics committee opinions over the last twenty years,6 
as well as a series of amendments to the American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model 
Rules”).7 Though it is now universally accepted that lawyers can 
use technology for client communications, the prevalence of 
technology does not dictate that its use is always appropriate. 
                                                                                                             
In the past, lawyers communicated with clients by telephone, in person, by 
facsimile or by letter. Lawyers typically stored client confidences in paper 
form, often inside locked file cabinets, behind locked office doors or in offsite 
storage facilities. Even when confidential client information was maintained 
electronically, the information was stored on desktop computers that 
remained within the firm or on servers typically located in the same office. 
Today, lawyers regularly communicate with clients electronically, and 
confidential information is stored on mobile devices, such as laptops, tablets, 
smartphones, and flash drives, as well as on law firm and third-party servers 
(i.e., in the “cloud”) that are accessible from anywhere. 
Id. 
 4 A lawyer’s use of email for client communications potentially impacts both the 
lawyer’s compliance with ethical requirements and ability to assert that the attorney-
client privilege protects the communication. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 cmt. 5 (2013). This Article focuses solely on the implications for the lawyer’s 
compliance with ethical requirements. 
 5 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.4, 1.6 (2013). 
 6 See infra notes 10-12, 14-35, 37-40, 48-78, 84-93, 97-109, 111-19, 130-32 and 
accompanying text. The ethics committee opinions have analyzed issues such as 
whether a lawyer can use email to communicate with a client, whether a lawyer can 
use third-party service providers to store client confidential information, and whether a 
lawyer who receives misdirected or unintended confidential information from opposing 
counsel can review the information. Part II discusses ethics committee opinions 
analyzing the use of mobile telephones and email. Issues relating to the use of third-
party service providers to store confidential client information and the lawyer’s 
obligations upon receipt of confidential client information from opposing counsel are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 7 See infra notes 135-65,167-72 and accompanying text. 
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Because the majority of today’s law students and new 
lawyers are predisposed to use technology,8 law professors and 
supervising lawyers should raise these ethical issues with their 
students and the new lawyers under their supervision, 
respectively. This instruction is crucial because law students’ and 
new lawyers’ comfort with technology perhaps makes it more 
difficult for them to anticipate risks associated with it, which 
ethics opinions and the Model Rules require. 
Part I of this Article analyzes state and ABA ethics opinions 
that consider the propriety of a lawyer’s use of technology for 
client communications. Part II discusses changes to the Model 
Rules since 2000 relating to the use of technology by lawyers and 
its impact on the practice of law. Part III proposes that law 
professors and lawyers charged with instructing or mentoring law 
students and new lawyers regarding client communications 
educate them regarding not only the content of those 
communications, but also how and when to use technology. 
Perhaps ironically, the additional instruction regarding how and 
when to use technology is a necessity because of the frequency and 
ease with which the current generation of law students uses 
technology. 
I. ETHICS OPINIONS ANALYZING THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR 
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 
Armed with a set of ethical rules drafted during a period well 
before the rise of smart phones, tablets, and laptop computers, 
ethics committees in the 1990s began tackling the issue of 
whether and how lawyers could use technology to communicate 
with their clients. First, the ethics committees considered whether 
lawyers could use mobile telephones for conversations with their 
clients. In the mid-1990s, the focus shifted from mobile telephones 
to email as its use became more prevalent with practitioners. 
                                                                                                             
 8 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MILLENTIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 25 
(2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-
connected-open-to-change.pdf (“Millennials [the generation that includes current law 
students and new lawyers] outpace older Americans in virtually all types of Internet 
and cell use.”). 
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A. Mobile Telephones 
Mobile telephones were the first technology to be subject to 
scrutiny by ethics committees. Specifically, the ethics committees 
considered the highly debated topic of whether a lawyer could 
even use either a cordless or a cellular telephone to talk with a 
client.9 Questions emerged regarding the use of mobile telephones 
for conversations with clients because of the concern that a third 
party could overhear or intercept the conversation. 
Conversations using mobile telephones were believed 
susceptible to interception because of the technology used in 
transmitting signals: radio waves.10 The use of radio waves 
increased the risk of interception of mobile telephone 
conversations because even unsophisticated devices like baby 
monitors use radio waves.11 Specifically, a third party could 
potentially overhear or intercept a conversation in one of several 
different ways: intentionally eavesdropping by use of a scanner, 
“pirating” by an employee of a cellular provider, or unintentionally 
hearing the conversation because of a cross in radio bands.12 
                                                                                                             
 9 See generally David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client 
Confidences by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 481-85 (1997) 
(describing confidentiality concerns relating to use of cordless and cellular telephones); 
Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Competence and Confidentiality in the Context of 
Cellular Telephone, Cordless Telephone, and E-mail Communications, 33 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 467, 475-78 (1997) (same). 
 10 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf; Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 
Conduct, Op. 90-44 (1991), available at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f
6686256497004ce492/4764a33e255e9f02862564b2000f5939?OpenDocument; N.H. Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO9
1-92-6.pdf; N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995), available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=26&from=1/1995&to=12/1995. For a 
discussion of the security of communications transmitted by radio waves, see generally 
Fred Jay Meyer, Note, Don’t Touch that Dial: Radio Listening Under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 418-25 (1988). According 
to Meyer, communication systems that rely on radio waves are less secure because 
“they rely upon signals which are dispersed widely into public areas.” Id. at 419. 
Systems such as land-line telephones and fiber optic transmission lines are more 
secure because of their closed-circuit nature. Id. at 418-19. 
 11 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf. 
 12 N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhb
ar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf. 
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Because the primary concern relating to the use of mobile 
telephones was an overhearing or intercepting third party, the 
relevant provision in the Model Rules was Rule 1.6. In the early 
1990s, the relevant text of Rule 1.6 provided as follows: “A lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).”13 
This duty not to disclose a client’s confidential information 
implied a duty to communicate in a way that would provide a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.14 Discharging this duty 
required a lawyer to exercise professional judgment in choosing 
the most appropriate method for the communication.15 
Because of their concerns about confidentiality, some of the 
first ethics committees to consider the issue required lawyers to 
obtain express client consent after full disclosure of the risks 
before using a mobile telephone for client communications.16 For 
example, the Ethics Committee of the New Hampshire Bar 
Association determined that the lawyer and client in a mobile 
telephone conversation did not have a reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                             
 13 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1995). Subsection (b) permitted 
disclosure only to prevent the client from committing a crime likely to cause imminent 
death or substantial bodily injury or to allow the lawyer to prepare a defense to an 
action brought by the client or a criminal charge or claim based upon the lawyer’s 
conduct involving the client. Id. 
 14 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997), 
available at http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/96-10.pdf; Hricik, 
supra note 9, at 478-79; Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 9, at 475-78. 
 15 Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-2 
(1999)), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions
/1999/Op%2099-002.doc (stating that nature of communication, client preferences, 
changes in technology, and developments in law guide lawyer’s exercise of professional 
judgment regarding selection of method of communication). 
 16 E.g., Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994), available at 
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5 
(“In our view, lawyers should not discuss confidential information on a cellular 
telephone if there is any nontrivial risk that such information could be overhead by a 
third party, whether that third party be involved in the particular matter or not.”); 
N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at http://www.nhbar.org/
pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf. But see Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 95-11 (1995), available at 
http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=463 (“However, the 
time has not yet come when a lawyer’s mere use of a cellular phone to communicate 
with the client—without resort to a scrambling device or exculpatory language at the 
call’s beginning—constitutes an ethical breach.”). 
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privacy because of the possibility of interception by a third party.17 
As support for its position, the Ethics Committee cited federal 
court decisions finding no expectation of privacy in cellular 
telephone conversations for purposes of Fourth Amendment 
analysis.18 For those reasons, the Ethics Committee advised that 
lawyers disclose the risk of mobile telephone conversations with 
their clients and obtain express consent before proceeding.19 The 
Ethics Committee did not limit its admonitions about mobile 
telephone conversations to instances in which the lawyer uses a 
mobile telephone.20 Rather, the Ethics Committee opined that a 
lawyer who knows or has reason to know that the client is using a 
mobile telephone to talk with the lawyer should warn the client of 
the risks associated with its use.21 
That the third party who might overhear the lawyer’s 
conversation with the client would almost never be someone 
involved in the legal matter did not alter the analysis.22 The fact 
scenario proposed to the Massachusetts Bar Association assumed 
that the mobile telephone conversations would take place in a 
sparsely populated area with “almost no risk of interception by 
parties with an interest in the subject matter of the call.”23 The 
committee required the lawyer to obtain consent before using a 
mobile telephone for confidential communications, regardless of 
whether the eavesdropper was involved in the legal matter.24 
                                                                                                             
 17 N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992), available at 
http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. A one-time disclosure and consent given at the onset of the representation 
would not have necessarily satisfied the New Hampshire Ethics Committee. Rather, 
the Ethics Committee instructed lawyers to consider the sophistication of the client 
and sensitivity of the communication in determining whether to obtain the client’s 
consent before each use of a mobile telephone. Id. 
 22 Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994), available at 
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5; 
see also N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992) available at 
http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO91-92-6.pdf (determining that lawyer must obtain client’s 
consent for mobile telephone conversation even when risks of interception were from 
third party unrelated to subject matter of conversation). 
 23 Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994), available at http://www.massbar.org/pu
blications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1994/opinion-no-94-5. 
 24 Id. 
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Not all ethics committees were so quick to limit a lawyer’s 
use of mobile telephones. For example, the Arizona Committee on 
the Rules of Professional Conduct analyzed a series of cases 
considering whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in 
mobile telephone conversations for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.25 The Arizona committee recognized the risk of 
interception of the communication, but it refused to conclude that 
the “mere use of a cellular phone to communicate with the client – 
without resort to a scrambling device or exculpatory language at 
the call’s beginning – constitutes an ethical breach.”26 
Other ethics committees adopted a more case-by-case 
approach to mobile telephones.27 For example, in a November 14, 
1992 formal ethics opinion, the Ethics Committee of the Colorado 
Bar Association analyzed a lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential 
client communications when using technology.28 Specifically, the 
committee considered the “[e]ver-increasing varieties of 
communications products . . . , such as cordless telephones, 
cellular telephones, facsimile machines, voice messaging and 
computer modems.”29 Focusing specifically on cordless and cellular 
telephone communications, the committee recognized the potential 
that communications made through technology could be 
intercepted.30 Because of the risks of interception and misdirected 
communications, the committee recognized at least three 
responsibilities for lawyers: (i) a duty to use reasonable care in the 
selection of the mode of communications, (ii) a duty to use 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 95-11 (1995). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 90-7 (1990) 
(withdrawn); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 90-44 (1991), 
available at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/4764
a33e255e9f02862564b2000f5939?OpenDocument (requiring lawyer to warn client that 
conversations by mobile telephone are not confidential); N.C. State Bar, Op. RPC 215 
(1995) (requiring lawyers to minimize risk of disclosure of mobile telephone 
conversations by using reasonable care in selecting mode of communication and 
warning client of risk of interception when lawyer has reason to know of risk). 
 28 Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 90 (1992), available at 
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_90_2
011.pdf. 
 29 Id. The Ethics Committee recognized that advances in technology would 
continue to make both the communication and the interception of those 
communications easier. Id. 
 30 Id. 
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reasonable care in using the technology, and (iii) a duty to warn 
the client of the potential for interception of the confidential 
information when an unsecure method is used.31 
With respect to the use of the technology, the committee 
provided several instructive examples of ways that even a 
properly selected mode of communication can threaten the client’s 
confidential information.32 According to the committee, a lawyer 
must use reasonable care to avoid the unintended disclosure of 
confidential information through facsimile or voice mail messages 
sent to shared machines and voice mail messages left in the 
incorrect mailbox.33 Although a still very new technology at the 
time of the opinion, the committee emphasized that these same 
risks of disclosure apply to “communications via computer modem 
or electronic mail.”34 Finally, the committee imposed a duty on the 
lawyer to warn the client or other parties to the communication 
when the lawyer or other parties uses a mode of communication 
that is unsecure or is “subject to relatively easy interception.”35 
Once advances in technology36 changed the way in which 
cordless and cellular telephones transmit signals, more ethics 
committees began permitting the use, without prior client consent, 
of some mobile telephones for client conversations.37 According to 
some ethics committees, use of a cordless telephone still violated 
the lawyer’s ethical obligations because the phones used radio 
waves to transmit signals and could be intercepted by something 
                                                                                                             
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Derek D. Wood, The Emergence of Cellular and Cordless Telephones and the 
Resulting Effect on the Tension Between Privacy and Wiretapping, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 
377, 385-86 (1997). 
 37 See generally Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999) (“Digital 
cordless and cellular telephones may be used by a lawyer to transmit and receive 
confidential client information when used within a digital service area.”). Interestingly, 
the Minnesota opinion did not include fax machines within its list of approved devices. 
The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board opined that facsimiles are problematic 
because the communication could be viewed by persons other than the intended 
recipient. Id. The Board said the same concerns applied to voice mail messages, but it 
did not identify any concern with email. Id. 
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as unsophisticated as a baby monitor.38 Lawyers, however, could 
use cellular telephones and cordless telephones that relied on 
digital technology to transmit signals because of the increased 
difficulty in interception and criminal penalties for interception.39 
Changes in the federal law imposing criminal penalties for 
interception of cordless telephone conversations eventually led 
some ethics committees to put cordless telephone conversations on 
equal footing with digital cellular conversations.40 
B. Email 
In the mid-1990s, the focus of ethics committee opinions 
shifted from mobile telephone conversations to unencrypted41 
email.42 Although the ethics committees’ primary emphasis in 
analyzing email focused on the same confidentiality concerns 
                                                                                                             
 38 See id. (permitting use of analog cordless or cellular telephone for confidential 
client conversations only with client’s express prior consent after consultation); Del. 
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf (describing split of authority regarding propriety 
of using mobile telephones to communicate with clients); supra notes 11-12 and 
accompanying text. Prior to 1994, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act did not 
protect conversations using cordless telephones, but it did protect cellular telephone 
conversations. Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001) available 
at http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf.; see Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New 
and Emerging Telecommunications Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 39 HOW. L.J. 437, 448-49 (1996). Congress treated cellular telephones 
differently than cordless telephones because, although both used radio technologies at 
that time, cellular telephone conversations were considered more difficult to intercept. 
In part because of this distinction in the legal consequences for interception and 
because of perceived differences in the likelihood of interception of radio 
communications used in cordless telephones, many courts found that cordless 
telephone conversations were not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
Fourth Amendment analysis. See id. at 448-54 (analyzing treatment of radio 
communications under case and statutory law). 
 39 Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999). 
 40 Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf. 
 41 Email messages can be “encrypted” to ensure that only the intended recipient 
can access the message. To encrypt a message, the sender uses a computer program to 
scramble the message, “locks” the message, and provides the “key” to the recipient that 
can be used to “unlock” the message. See generally Hricik, supra note 9, at 493-96 
(discussing process, merits, and drawbacks of encryption). Encrypted email messages, 
therefore, do not raise the same confidentiality concerns as unencrypted ones. 
 42 The propriety of using email for client communications was a hot topic for legal 
commentators in the 1990s. See Hricik, supra note 9, at 461. 
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raised with mobile telephones,43 email posed additional ethical 
concerns as well. Specifically, the ability to represent a client 
without (perhaps even ever) meeting the client in person raised 
concerns about the lawyer’s ability to represent competently and 
to communicate adequately with the client.44 
As email use became more prevalent and accepted, ethics 
committees began focusing on how the lawyer and client were 
using email.45 Specifically, ethics committees observed that the 
lawyer’s and client’s choices regarding when and how to email 
could impact its confidentiality. Thus, ethics committees began 
requiring lawyers to consider the day-to-day use of technology in 
making choices about its appropriateness. 
1. Duty to Preserve Confidentiality of Client Information 
The ethics committees’ consideration of email paralleled their 
consideration of mobile telephones in many ways. Some of the first 
ethics committees to consider the propriety of using unencrypted 
email for client communications were hesitant about its use and 
implemented stringent requirements.46 Much like with mobile 
telephones, as the technology and law developed, however, most 
ethics committees eventually became more permissive regarding 
its use.47 
a. Earliest Opinions Limit Use of Email 
In January 1995, the Ethics Advisory Committee of the 
South Carolina Bar Association issued the first ethics opinion 
focusing specifically on the use of email to communicate with 
clients.48 A physically disabled lawyer who wanted to represent 
clients via a virtual law office provided the impetus for the 
committee to consider the propriety of using email for confidential 
                                                                                                             
 43 See infra notes 47-94 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text. 
 48 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 94-27 (1995), available at 
http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleI
d/507/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-94-27.aspx. 
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client information.49 Specifically, the lawyer proposed establishing 
an on-line service through which the lawyer would provide general 
information about legal matters and then represent individual 
clients met through the on-line service.50 The lawyer proposed 
using electronic media exclusively to communicate with the 
client.51 The committee found that the use of a virtual law office 
raised ethical questions with respect to advertising and 
solicitation, client conflicts, unauthorized practice of law, and 
client confidentiality.52 
Considering what it determined to be an issue of first 
impression, the committee opined as follows with respect to client 
confidentiality: “Thus, it is the opinion of the committee that 
unless certainty can be obtained regarding the confidentiality of 
communications via electronic media, that representation of a 
client, or communication with a client, via electronic media, may 
violate Rule 1.6, absent an express waiver by the client.”53 
In requiring an express waiver from the client for electronic 
communications, the committee relied on ethics opinions from 
Massachusetts, New York City, and New Hampshire analyzing 
communications via cellular telephones and requiring client 
consent when the conversation could be overheard.54 The 
committee determined that email communication posed the same 
threat of interception by a service provider.55 
The South Carolina ethics committee was not alone in its 
early concerns about the confidentiality of unencrypted email. 
Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics 
and Conduct determined that a lawyer could communicate via 
unencrypted email with a client with respect to “sensitive 
                                                                                                             
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Three years later, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee 
determined that “improvements in technology and changes in the law” made a lawyer’s 
expectation that electronic correspondence would be confidential reasonable and 
permitted South Carolina lawyers to use email to communicate with clients. S.C. Bar 
Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997), available at 
http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleI
d/561/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-97-08.aspx. 
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material” only with the express written consent of the client.56 The 
board broadly defined “sensitive material” to include, at a 
minimum, “information gained in the professional relationship 
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental 
to the client.”57 The board suggested that this definition be broadly 
construed to provide the most protection to client 
communications.58 This expansive reading of “sensitive 
information” therefore suggests that the category of 
communications for which unencrypted email communication 
would be inappropriate extends beyond what the ethics rules 
might define as “confidential.” 
Other early state bar ethics committees also expressed 
concern regarding the security of unencrypted email for 
confidential client communication. For example, a 1995 opinion 
from the North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee warned 
lawyers about the risk of interception of mobile telephone and 
email communications.59 According to the opinion, anyone who 
has access to the lawyer’s computer network (or presumably the 
client’s computer network) can intercept an email.60 The opinion 
instructed North Carolina lawyers to use reasonable care to select 
the mode of communication that would best protect client 
confidential information and to warn the other parties to the 
communication if the lawyer knows or has reason to know of a 
threat of its interception.61 
                                                                                                             
 56 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997), available 
at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/290d06050ed
025988625651c0050a51c?OpenDocument. In Opinion 97-01, the Board amended a prior 
opinion. Id. 
 57 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 96-33 (1997), available 
at http://www.iabar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/29abd3c68930b
c03862564f400137b2b?OpenDocument. 
 58 Id. (“Certainly this would be a minimal test. Client’s judgment should be 
augmented by counsel’s independent judgment. The Board believes the best guideline 
would favor the most strict standards.”). 
 59 N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995), available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=26&from=1/1995&to=12/1995. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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The newness of email technology led more than one ethics 
committee to require consent for its use.62 In a 1997 informal 
opinion, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility cautiously approached the 
use of unencrypted email for communicating with clients.63 The 
committee recognized that the threat of interception of email is 
similar to the threat for other modes of communicating, but 
determined that the relative newness and differing opinions 
regarding the security of electronic communication warranted 
different treatment.64 Although the committee rejected encryption 
for most communications, the committee determined that 
communicating via email with clients necessitated client 
consent.65 
Echoing a similar concern about the developing knowledge 
base for email, a Missouri informal advisory opinion required 
Missouri lawyers to inform clients of the nature of the risks of 
unencrypted electronic communication before using it.66 A later 
opinion rejected the notion that a standard consent form would be 
adequate to satisfy the lawyer’s consent requirement.67 According 
to the opinion, the appropriateness of unencrypted email depends 
on the setting in which the client sends and receives email as well 
as the information being communicated.68 The opinion also 
described the relevant risks of the communication as extending 
beyond the concern that the communication could be intercepted 
and including shared access to the communication through a home 
                                                                                                             
 62 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 980137 (1998), 
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx; Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 97-130 (1997). 
 63 See Pa. Bar. Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 97-130 
(1997). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (“A lawyer has complied with his or her ethical obligations if the risks and 
benefits associated with the use of email are explained to the client and the client 
consents. Lawyer and client together can agree to use e-mail for all, some or none of 
their communications. They can also agree whether or not to use encryption.”). 
 66 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 980137 (1998), 
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx. 
 67 Mo. Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 990007 (1999), 
available at http://www.mobar.org/ethics/InformalOpinionsSearch.aspx. 
 68 Id. 
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or work computer and the perpetual life span of electronic 
documents.69 
Finally, even some ethics committees that refused to require 
lawyers to encrypt all client email recommended that lawyers 
warn their clients about the risk of interception, primarily because 
of a concern that clients were unaware of the risk associated with 
email.70 For example, the Connecticut Committee on Professional 
Ethics opined as follows: 
[The lawyer’s] fundamental responsibilities require, at a 
minimum, that a lawyer (1) consult with the client to ensure 
that the client is aware of risks involved in using unencrypted 
email for confidential communications, and (2) use good 
judgment and discretion in choosing an appropriate method 
for communicating confidential client information, and 
counsel his or her client to do likewise.71 
Because the Model Rules put the burden on the lawyer to use 
reasonable efforts to protect the client’s confidential information, 
the lawyer is responsible for making certain that the client does 
not communicate with the lawyer in a way that jeopardizes the 
confidential information.72 The Arizona Bar Association went a 
step further and suggested that Arizona lawyers state in the 
subject line or in the beginning of the email the privileged nature 
of the communication.73 
b. Majority Approach Permits Use of Email in Most 
Circumstances 
Like with mobile telephones, ethics committees became more 
permissive of the use of unencrypted email for client 
communications over time and eventually developed a majority 
trend allowing its use under most circumstances. Specifically, the 
majority of ethics committees that have considered the issue have 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. 
 70 Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998), available at 
https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/98_2.html; Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999). 
 71 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/
EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=480. 
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now determined that communicating via unencrypted email does 
not pose risks that are new or more significant than the risks 
posed by other modes of communicating that are well-accepted.74 
In addition, those jurisdictions have emphasized that intercepting 
electronic communications is illegal.75 For those reasons, the 
majority of jurisdictions, including the ABA,76 have permitted 
lawyers to communicate via email with clients without encryption 
or prior client consent, unless unusual circumstances exist.77 
                                                                                                             
 74 See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 76 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (“A 
lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by 
unencrypted email sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from a technological and legal standpoint.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2 (1998) (“[A]n attorney is free 
to communicate using e-mail on any matters with a client that the attorney would 
otherwise feel free to discuss over the telephone or via fax transmission.”); Ariz. State 
Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/V
iewEthicsOpinion?id=480 (“[I]t is not unethical to communicate with a client via e-mail 
even if the e-mail is not encrypted.”); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-
52 (1999) (“Therefore, in the committee’s view a lawyer may, under ordinary 
circumstances, use unencrypted email for communicating matters relating to 
representation of a client without violating Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”); Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/2001-2.pdf (“The transmission of confidential information by 
way of e-mail . . . , absent extraordinary circumstances, does not violate Rule 1.6.”); 
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at http://www.dcbar
.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion281.cfm (“We conclude that the use 
of unencrypted electronic mail is not, by itself, a violation of Rule 1.6.”); Fla. Bar 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-4 (2000), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/
tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+OPINION+00-4?opendocument (“An attorney may 
communicate with the client using unencrypted e-mail under most circumstances.”); 
Haw. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Formal Op. 40 (2001), available at 
http://www.odchawaii.com/uploads/FO_40_-_E-MAIL_SECURITY.pdf (“An attorney 
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by encrypted or 
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating HRPC 1.6(a).”); Ill. State 
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997), available at 
http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/96-10.pdf; Me. Prof’l Ethics 
Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index
.php?topic=mebar_overseers_ethics_opinions&id=63338&v=article (“The Commission 
concludes that, as a general matter and subject to appropriate safeguards, an attorney 
may utilize unencrypted e-mail without violating the attorney’s ethical obligation to 
maintain client confidentiality.”); Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 00-1 (2000), available at 
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/2000-2009/2000/opinion-no-00-1 
(“A lawyer’s use of unencrypted Internet e-mail to engage in confidential 
communications with his or her client does not violate Massachusetts Rule of 
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Ethics committees decided that the use of unencrypted email 
to communicate with a client did not violate the lawyer’s 
obligations under Rule 1.6 not because the use of email did not 
pose risks of interception, but because those risks were not 
materially different from older, more established forms of 
communication. In a 1999 opinion, the Committee on Professional 
Ethics for the Connecticut Bar Association described the potential 
ways in which an email might be intercepted.78 First, although 
extremely unlikely, one could intercept a particular email in 
transit from the sender to the recipient.79 Because of the way 
email is transmitted via the Internet,80 the committee determined 
that it was highly unlikely that an individual could target a 
particular email and intercept it.81 Two other scenarios, however, 
posed more likely examples of interception. Using a software 
program, one could monitor any email messages that are sent 
through a certain computer or computer network.82 In addition, a 
system administrator could monitor or access emails sent through 
a computer or computer network.83 
                                                                                                             
Professional Conduct 1.6(a) in usual circumstances.”); Minn. Lawyers Prof’l 
Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 (1999) (“E-mail without encryption may be used to transmit 
and receive confidential client information.”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.
aspx?id=5550 (“We therefore conclude that lawyers may in ordinary circumstances 
utilize unencrypted Internet e-mail to transmit confidential information without 
breaching their duties of confidentiality under Canon 4 to their clients, as the 
technology is in use today.”); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 
99-2 (1999) (“[A] lawyer does not violate the duty to preserve confidences and secrets 
under DR 4-101 of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility by communicating with 
clients through electronic mail without encryption.”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory 
Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000), available at http://www.utahbar.org/ethics-advisory-
opinions/eaoc-00-01/ (“A lawyer may, in ordinary circumstances, use unencrypted 
Internet e-mail to transmit client confidential information without violating the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Advisory Ethics 
Op. 97-05 (1997), available at http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney
%20Resources/aeopinions/Advisory%20Ethics%20Opinions/Lawyer%27s%20Duty/97-
05.pdf (“A lawyer does not violate DR 4-101 by communicating with a client by e-mail, 
including the Internet, without encryption.”). 
 78 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999). 
 79 Id. 
 80 For a helpful description of how the Internet transmits email, see Hricik, supra 
note 9, at 462-69. 
 81 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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Even older, established forms of communication such as land-
line telephone calls, letters through the postal service, or courier 
deliveries are subject to interception.84 For example, the Ethics 
Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association reasoned that 
Illinois lawyers could communicate via email85 with clients 
without encryption or prior consent by analogizing email to a 
landline telephone call.86 The committee reasoned that both forms 
of communication were susceptible to interception but that federal 
law prohibited that interception.87 Because a lawyer undoubtedly 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the landline telephone 
call, the lawyer also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
email.88 In addition, the ABA determined that privacy policies 
governing the lawyer’s email account would limit the threat that a 
system administrator would monitor email.89 
Ethics committees almost universally recognize a caveat to 
the general rule: emails of a highly sensitive nature require 
heightened security measures.90 These ethics committees have 
almost universally rejected the notion that all emails should be 
treated identically. Rather, emails that contain highly sensitive or 
                                                                                                             
 84 See Hricik, supra note 9, at 479-81, 496. 
 85 The Illinois opinion describes the different ways that email can be transmitted 
from the sender to the recipient: “through a private or local area network (within a 
single firm or organization), through an electronic mail service (such as America 
Online, CompuServ or MCI Mail), over the Internet, or through any combination of 
these methods.” Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 
(1997), Under the majority trend, emails transmitted through any of these methods are 
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.; see also Hricik, supra note 9, at 485-
506. 
 86 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997). Several 
other state ethics committees have explicitly adopted the rationale of the Illinois 
opinion. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. E-403 (1998), available at 
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-403.pdf; State Bar Ass’n of 
N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 97-09 (1997), available at http://www.sband.org/userf
iles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf (relying on Illinois, South Carolina, and Vermont ethics 
opinions); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. of Prof’l Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 
(1997). 
 87 Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997). 
 88 Id. 
 89 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999). 
 90 See, e.g., id. (“The Committee recognizes that there may be unusual 
circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter that might require 
enhanced security measures like encryption. These situations would, however, be of the 
nature that ordinary telephones and other normal means of communication would also 
be deemed inadequate.”). 
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confidential matters require different treatment. Some ethics 
committees have opined that lawyers in that state should obtain 
express client consent before emailing regarding highly sensitive 
or confidential matters.91 The prevailing wisdom among other 
ethics committees is that enhanced security measures, like 
encryption, may be necessary for communications that involve 
“extraordinarily sensitive matters.”92 
Though most ethics committees have not required prior client 
consent or encryption in order for a lawyer to use email to 
communicate with clients, those ethics committees have 
emphasized that lawyers have an obligation to follow the client’s 
instructions with respect to the method of communication.93 
Therefore, regardless of whether that jurisdiction permits the 
lawyer to use email for client communications, the client’s 
instructions or preferences for some other form of communication 
prevail. The Maine Professional Ethics Commission offered the 
                                                                                                             
 91 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999); Mass. Bar Ass’n, 
Ethics Op. 00-1 (2000). 
 92 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 
(1999); Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2 (1998); Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 00-1 
(2000); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. 709 (1998); State Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 97-09 (1997), 
available at http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf; Utah State Bar 
Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000); Vt. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 (1997). The Arizona Bar Association 
recommended that lawyers encrypt communications that contain “highly sensitive 
information.” Ariz. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-04 (1997), available at http://www.azbar.
org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=480. Although the North Dakota 
opinion carved out an exception for “extraordinarily sensitive” communications like the 
Illinois opinion did, the scope of the question that the committee considered was 
limited to just “routine matters.” State Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 97-
09 (1997), available at http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/ethics/97-09.pdf (“Is 
Rule 1.6 . . . violated by a lawyer who communicates routine matters with clients, 
and/or other lawyers jointly representing clients . . . ?”). The opinion does not make 
clear whether “routine matters” includes confidential client information that does not 
meet the threshold for “extraordinarily sensitive.” See id. Likewise, the South Carolina 
Bar Ethics Advisory Committee opined that South Carolina lawyers could 
communicate with clients via email, but it observed that “A lawyer should discuss with 
a client such options as encryption in order to safeguard against even inadvertent 
disclosure of sensitive or privileged information when using e-mail.” S.C. Bar Ethics 
Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997), available at http://www.scbar.org
/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleId/561/Ethics-
Advisory-Opinion-97-08.aspx. 
 93 Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 00-1 (2000); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 
Op. 709 (1998); Utah Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 00-01 (2000). 
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following general guidance: “[A]ttorneys should discuss with 
clients their preferred method(s) of communication and follow the 
client’s wishes, should consider the degree of confidentiality of 
particular information in determining appropriate means to send 
it, and should take reasonable precautions to make sure that the 
address is correct and properly targeted.”94 
Therefore, by the early 2000s, most jurisdictions permitted 
lawyers to use unencrypted email for client communications, so 
long as the communication was not regarding an extraordinarily 
sensitive matter or contrary to client instructions. 
2. Duties to Provide Competent Representation and to 
Communicate with the Client 
In analyzing a lawyer’s proposed use of technology to 
communicate with a client, ethics committees have also stressed 
the role of the lawyer’s duty of competence and duty to 
communicate with the client. Rule 1.1 requires that a lawyer 
“provide competent representation.”95 It defines “competent 
representation” as follows: “Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”96 Rule 1.4 requires 
the lawyer to keep the client “reasonably informed” about the 
status of the matter, promptly respond to the client’s inquiries, 
and explain matters to the client in sufficient detail so that the 
client can make informed decisions about the representation.97 
In analyzing a lawyer’s duty of competence, ethics 
committees have emphasized that the standards that govern a 
lawyer’s conduct are constant regardless of the method that the 
lawyer uses to communicate with the client.98 For example, the 
                                                                                                             
 94 Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008). 
 95 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/rule_1_1_competence.html. 
 96 Id. 
 97 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rule
s_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_4_communications.html. 
 98 Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Va. State Bar, Op. 1791 (2003), available 
at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1791.htm; see also N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 
10 (2006) (“While the Internet is a tool of convenience and appears to respond to the 
2014] TECHNOLOGY & CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 265 
Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics pointed 
out that the descriptions of the obligations in Rule 1.1 all pertain 
to the “content” of the representation and do not prescribe a 
method for delivering that content.99 
Ethics committees have reasoned similarly with respect to 
the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the client under Rule 1.4. 
Like it stated about the lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.1, the 
Virginia ethics committee explained that Rule 1.4 focuses on the 
content of the lawyer’s communications with the client rather 
than the method of delivery.100 So long as the lawyer 
communicates the necessary information to the client, the lawyer 
complies with Rule 1.4 regardless of whether the lawyer meets 
with the client in-person or uses technology to convey the 
information. 
Using technology, however, can make compliance with the 
ethical obligations of Rule 1.1 and 1.4 more challenging. For 
example, with respect to using technology to communicate with 
clients, the lawyer’s duties to keep client information confidential 
and to act competently are necessarily intermingled. According to 
the authorities, a lawyer who does not analyze and minimize the 
risks associated with using technology to communicate with 
clients potentially violates the lawyer’s duty of competence.101 For 
instance, in its 2011 opinion describing a lawyer’s duty to warn a 
client about using technology to communicate when the factual 
context posed an increased risk of access by a third party, the ABA 
ethics committee relied on both Rule 1.1 and Rule 1.6.102 
Even beyond the concern about whether the lawyer is giving 
competent advice to the client with respect to the confidentiality of 
                                                                                                             
consumer’s need for fast solutions, the cyber lawyer must still deliver competent 
representation. To this end, he or she should make every effort to make the same 
inquiries, to engage in the same level of communication, and to take the same 
precautions as a competent lawyer does in a law office setting.”). 
 99 Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Va. State Bar, Op. 1791 (2003) 
(“Whether that procedure involves the provision of competent legal services depends on 
the content, not the method of communication; what does determine competency in this 
situation is whether the attorney reviews the proper materials and law, imparts to the 
client all necessary information, receives necessary direction from the client as to the 
client’s objectives, and provides appropriate legal advice as a result.”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011). 
 102 Id. 
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communication via technology,103 the lawyer’s use of technology 
can also raise questions about the substance of the representation. 
Specifically, through using technology, a lawyer can represent a 
client without ever meeting with the client in-person.104 
Representing a client without in-person contact poses several 
risks, including that the lawyer lacks a complete understanding of 
the underlying facts or that the client does not understand the 
lawyer’s advice. 
Only communication that is meaningful and capable of being 
understood by the client satisfies the lawyer’s ethical duty to 
communicate with the client. In addition to arising in the context 
of virtual law offices, an emphasis on the need for the 
communication to be meaningful has arisen in the context of 
lawyers who use a different language to communicate than their 
clients.105 For example, according to the California State Bar 
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, 
if the lawyer cannot engage in meaningful communication with 
                                                                                                             
 103 The use of technology poses other issues relating to the lawyer’s provision of 
competent representation. For example, one ethics committee has pointed out that a 
lawyer cannot rely on an on-line discussion of a legal issue as a substitute for 
conducting the necessary legal research. See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l 
Conduct, Advisory Op. 12-15 (2012), available at http://www.isba.org/sites/default
/files/ethicsopinions/12-15.pdf. 
 104 See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/1999/O
p%2099-009.doc (considering whether Ohio ethical rules permit lawyer to conduct “on-
line representation of clients through email questions and answers”). Ethics 
committees have considered other instances of representation without in-person 
contact between the lawyer and the client that do not involve technology. See, e.g., 
State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. RI-349 
(2010), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-
349.cfm?CFID=58744146&CFTOKEN=fc8865fad05127c6-5F49C037-1A4B-3375-
E41BF353F0566041 (use of non-lawyer assistants); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., 
Ethics Advisory Op. 05-16 (2005), available at http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/
EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/ArticleId/708/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-05-
16.aspx (real estate closings “by mail”). With respect to conducting real estate closings 
by mail, the South Carolina ethics committee opined that the lawyer’s ethical 
obligations do not depend on whether the closing is conducted in person or by mail. 
Rather, in either instance, the lawyer must be accessible to the client “by telephone, 
facsimile, or electronic transmission.” Id. 
 105 See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, 
Formal Op. 1984-77 (1984), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?file
ticket=hQaC_moHrkc%3d&tabid=841 (considering ethical obligations of lawyer who 
speaks a different language than client). 
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the client in the lawyer’s language, “the attorney must take all 
reasonable steps to insure that the client comprehends the legal 
concepts involved and the advice given . . . .”106 Those steps might 
include hiring an interpreter or associating a bilingual lawyer.107 
The lack of in-person communication may make it difficult for 
the lawyer to determine whether the communication with the 
client satisfies this standard of “meaningful.” In an in-person 
meeting with the lawyer, the client’s non-verbal and verbal cues 
will help the lawyer determine whether the client understands the 
information being communicated.108 In the context of electronic 
communications like email, however, the lawyer cannot easily 
gauge the client’s understanding and, perhaps even more 
disconcerting, whether the client is in fact the person with whom 
the lawyer is communicating.109 Other technologies, such as video 
conferencing, perhaps alleviate some of these concerns because 
they allow the lawyer to see the non-verbal and to hear the verbal 
cues from the client. 
These same concerns arise for clients who might be less 
familiar with or have less access to technology than the lawyer. 
Even with the prevalence of technology in today’s society, the 
lawyer cannot assume that the client has access to the technology 
and the necessary skill set to use it.110 If the client cannot or does 
not have access to the technology, no “communication” occurs. 
Furthermore, even if the communication is accessed, the lawyer 
has no guarantee that the person accessing the communication is 
in fact the client.111 
Because ethics committees have not subjected electronic 
communications to a different standard than other types of 
communications, the requirements are neither more nor less 
stringent for electronic communications than a land-line telephone 
call or a traditional letter. Thus, the electronic communication, 
just like the telephone call or letter, must be the product of 
competent representation and be meaningful communication. 
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 107 Id. 
 108 Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Draft 
Formal Op. 2010-0003 (2010). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Hricik, supra note 9, at 470. 
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3. Duty to Avoid Using Email in a Way that Compromises Its 
Confidentiality 
Other ethics opinions, notably the most recent ones, identify 
an additional class of cases in which communication via 
unencrypted email is problematic: factual contexts involving a 
heightened risk of interception. 
Under certain circumstances, a lawyer’s work habits can 
expose client communications to a heightened risk of 
interception.112 For example, in a 2010 opinion, the Standing 
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the 
California State Bar considered a fact pattern that represents a 
fairly typical practice model for firm associates: use of a firm 
laptop to work on client matters at home or in public places.113 
The committee enumerated a list of factors that a lawyer should 
consider in using any technological device: security risks posed by 
the particular type of technology, including the availability of 
reasonable precautions; legal consequences of interfering with the 
communication; the sensitivity of the particular information; the 
effect on the client of disclosure of the information; the “urgency of 
the situation”; and the client’s instructions and circumstances.114 
With respect to the lawyer’s use of the laptop, the committee 
opined that the lawyer potentially violates the duties of 
confidentiality and competence by using public wireless Internet 
access absent encryption and a personal firewall.115 
To use technology ethically, a lawyer must also consider how 
the client uses technology and warn the client of associated risks. 
In a 2011 Formal Ethics Opinion, the ABA Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility recognized that the client’s 
manner of using technology could threaten the security of the 
                                                                                                             
 112 Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal 
Op. 2010-179 (2010), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. (“Depending on the sensitivity of the matter, Attorney may need to avoid 
using the public wireless connection entirely or notify Client of possible risks attendant 
to his use of the public wireless connection, including potential disclosure of 
confidential information and possible waiver of attorney-client privilege or work 
product protections, and seek her informed consent to do so.”). 
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communication.116 For example, a client’s email correspondence 
with a lawyer may be accessible by third parties if the client is 
using the employer’s email account, computer, smartphone, or 
device to email with the lawyer and the employer’s policies 
provide that the employer has a right of access to the account or 
device.117 A lawyer or perhaps even a third party who subpoenas 
the employer’s email records could also access the 
communications.118 Similarly, other members of the client’s 
household may be able to access the client’s communications with 
the lawyer if the client has a shared email account.119 According to 
the ABA committee, if a lawyer has reason to know that the client 
may use email to communicate in one of these ways, the lawyer 
has an ethical obligation to warn the client of the risk that a third 
party will read the communication and to refrain from emailing 
the client in a way that poses a risk of access by a third party.120 
                                                                                                             
 116 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/11_459_nm_formal_opinion.pdf. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc., the court described the effect of 
the employer’s ownership of and right to access email communications as follows: 
“[T]he effect of an employer email policy, such as that of BI, is to have the employer 
looking over your shoulder each time you send an email.” Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. 
Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 119 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011); see also 
Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001) (“Inevitably, 
circumstances may arise where there is a genuine risk of unauthorized access. For 
example, a lawyer representing one spouse in a matrimonial proceeding might need to 
refrain from communicating with the client by way of email if the other spouse shares 
access to a computer at their shared residence.”); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 
(2008) (“When exercising professional judgment in choosing a particular form of 
communication, lawyers should consider both the content of the communication as well 
as the security of the email address to which it is being sent. For example, an attorney 
representing a client in a divorce would generally not send sensitive advice in a letter 
to a client’s home address if the couple had not yet separated. Similarly, lawyers 
should be sensitive to the fact that others may have access to a client’s email address, 
especially at home. Likewise, some places of business routinely monitor their 
employees’ email and often have access to it.”). In a 1998 ethics opinion, the D.C. Bar 
Association similarly warned lawyers about the risks to confidentiality posed by the 
client’s manner of using technology. Although it used a facsimile delivered to the 
shared mail room of a client in a dispute with the employer as an example, its 
emphasis on the particular factual context mirrors that of the ABA. D.C. Bar Legal 
Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics
/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion281.cfm. 
 120 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011). 
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Not only do lawyers who communicate with a client when the 
client is using an employer’s email account or device risk an 
ethical violation, they also risk having to produce the 
communication in litigation because some courts have found that 
the attorney-client privilege does not attach or is waived in these 
circumstances.121 For example, in Scott v. Beth Israel Medical 
Center Inc., the court determined that the attorney-client privilege 
did not apply to email correspondence between a lawyer and client 
when the client used the employer’s email account to communicate 
with the lawyer and the employer’s handbook provided that the 
employer owned and had a right to access any communications 
sent through the account or the employer’s systems.122 Similarly, 
in Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that a client 
did not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality when the 
client used an employer-issued laptop to create or send 
communications to the lawyer, even though the client used a web-
based email program for the communication.123 The client did not 
have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the 
communications because the employer retained the right to access 
the computer in the employee handbook and the employer could 
access any communication that was sent through its server.124 The 
court found that the client had waived any privilege that might 
have previously attached to communications between the lawyer 
                                                                                                             
 121 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 
S.C. L. REV. 323, 351-55 (2012); Louise L. Hill, Personal Use of Workplace Computers: 
A Threat to Otherwise Privileged Communications, 15 J. INTERNET L. 20, 20 (2012); 
Kara R. Williams, Note, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding 
Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer Computer 
Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 365-67 (2008). 
 122 847 N.Y.S.2d at 439-44 (2007). The court described the effect of the employer’s 
ownership of and right to access email communications as follows: “[T]he effect of an 
employer e-mail policy, such as that of BI, is to have the employer looking over your 
shoulder each time you send an e-mail.” Id. at 440. But see Curto v. Med. World 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) 
(finding that employee who used employer-issued laptop to access a web-based email 
account in her home did not waive any applicable attorney-client or work product 
privilege that might otherwise apply). 
 123 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1108, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 124 Id. 
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and client that the client later saved on the employer-issued 
laptop.125 
Personal, password-protected, web-based emails that an 
employee sends or accesses via the employer’s computer fare 
better in some jurisdictions. For example, in Stengart v. Loving 
Care Agency, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court determined 
that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
personal, password-protected email that she sent through her 
web-based account when she did not save the password on the 
employer’s computer and the employer’s policy was ambiguous 
regarding the employer’s rights to web-based emails.126 The 
Stengart court suggested that even a policy in an unambiguous 
company handbook that “banned all personal computer use and 
provided unambiguous notice that an employer could retrieve and 
read an employee’s lawyer-client communications” might be 
unenforceable.127 
At least one commentator has suggested that this concern 
about third party access to an email account might extend beyond 
the employer-employee or domestic dispute contexts.128 
Specifically, when the ABA and the majority of state ethics 
committees determined that lawyers could use unencrypted email 
for client communications in the 1990s, they assumed that the 
service provider would not retain a copy of the email for an 
extended period of time and that the agreement between the 
service provider and the customer would protect, rather than 
limit, the email’s confidentiality.129 Today’s more lengthy and 
complex privacy agreements may not provide the protections that 
the ABA and other state ethics committees assumed existed or 
that did exist at that time.130 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. at 1109. 
 126 990 A.2d 650, 663-65 (N.J. 2010). 
 127 Id. at 665. 
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Other concerns relating to the use of email to communicate 
with clients relate to the delivery of the communication.131 For 
example, much like the facsimile message that can be picked up 
by anyone with access to the facsimile machine, so too may an 
email be read by anyone who sees it on the computer screen.132 
Email can also be misdirected and sent to an unknown third party 
or perhaps even an opposing litigant.133 Finally, a third party 
could respond to an email from the lawyer purporting to be the 
client and the lawyer would be none the wiser.134 
Thus, the lawyer has an affirmative duty to both use 
technology in a way that does not compromise confidentiality, and 
to monitor the client’s use of technology to ensure communication 
confidentiality. 
II. CHANGES TO THE MODEL RULES TO REFLECT THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNOLOGY ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
Because of its effect on the way lawyers practice, the use of 
technology by lawyers has led to two efforts to amend the Model 
Rules. Specifically, in both 1997 and 2009, the ABA formed 
commissions to study and propose revisions to the Model Rules to 
resolve concerns brought about by the use of technology. Both 
efforts ended in changes to the Model Rules and therefore altered 
the ethical landscape for practicing lawyers. 
A. Ethics 2000 
In 1997, the ABA formed the Ethics 2000 Commission to 
conduct a wholesale review of the Model Rules for the first time 
since 1983.135 One of the issues providing the backdrop against 
which the Ethics 2000 Commission considered amendments to the 
rules included “the impact of technology and globalization.”136 The 
                                                                                                             
 131 As stated in note 7, other ethics opinions and provisions of the Model Rules 
analyze the effect of the misdirected communication on the lawyer’s responsibilities. 
These opinions and provisions of the Model Rules are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 132 Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-52 (1999). 
 133 Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008). 
 134 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 135 Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441 (2002). 
 136 Id. at 442. 
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Ethics 2000 Commission’s amendments, however, included no 
changes to the black letter law of the Model Rules relating to a 
lawyer’s use of technology to communicate with the client but 
rather changes to the comments for Rules 1.4 and 1.6. 
With respect to Rule 1.4, the Ethics 2000 Commission’s 
acknowledgment of the impact of technology on the lawyer’s duty 
to communicate with the client came in the form of an admonition 
to lawyers to promptly return or acknowledge the telephone calls 
of their clients.137 Specifically, the Ethics 2000 Commission 
recommended, and the House of Delegates approved, the following 
addition to language in Comment 4 that required a lawyer to 
respond promptly to client inquiries: “Client telephone calls 
should be promptly returned or acknowledged.”138 According to the 
Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, and perhaps as a sign of the 
prevalent use of the telephone for lawyer/client communications, 
the Ethics 2000 Commission “thought that emphasis should be 
given to promptly returning or at least acknowledging receipt of 
phones calls.”139 
The Ethics 2000 Commission proposed more substantial 
changes to Rule 1.6. Specifically, the approved changes to Rule 1.6 
included two new comments relating to the lawyer’s duty to 
protect the client’s confidential information. First, the Ethics 2000 
Commission added Comment 15, explaining that the lawyer has 
an affirmative duty to act competently to protect the client’s 
confidential information against inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure by the lawyer or those working with the lawyer.140 
Second, the Ethics 2000 Commission added Comment 16, 
which gives the lawyer guidance in discharging this duty. This 
guidance reflects the tenor of the then recent ethics committee 
opinions analyzing email communications. Specifically, much like 
                                                                                                             
 137 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 4 (2002). According to the 
Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, “the Commission thought that emphasis should be 
given to promptly returning or at least acknowledging receipt of phone calls.” ABA 
Ethics 2000 Comm’n, Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4 (2000) 
[hereinafter Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_com
mission/e2k_rule14rem.html. 
 138 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 4 (2002). 
 139 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes: Model Rule 1.4, supra note 137. 
 140 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2002). 
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the state and ABA ethics opinions, Comment 16 cautions the 
lawyer to consider the sensitivity of the information and legal 
consequence to those who might intercept the communication in 
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of 
privacy.141 It also warns the lawyer to consider the special 
circumstances surrounding the communication and instructions to 
the client in deciding whether additional security measures might 
be necessary.142 According to the Reporter’s Explanation of 
Changes, the Ethics 2000 Commission recognized the backdrop of 
the ethics committee opinions analyzing the use of unencrypted 
email to communicate with clients, but did not limit its guidance 
to email. 
B. Ethics 20/20 
Seven years later, at the end of its 2009 annual meeting, the 
ABA announced the formation of the ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 (“Ethics 20/20 Commission”).143 The stated purpose of the 
Ethics 20/20 Commission was to consider the impact of technology 
and globalization on the practice of law.144 Carolyn B. Lamm, the 
president of the ABA at that time, explained, “Technologies such 
as email, the Internet and smart phones are transforming the way 
we practice law and our relationship with clients, just as they 
have compressed our world and expanded international business 
opportunities for our clients.”145 
In particular, the Ethics 20/20 Commission identified three 
categories for its work: the regulation of lawyers who practice in 
multiple states and countries, “advances in technology that 
enhance virtual cross-border access,” and “other challenges 
presented by changing technology, including ‘data security and 
confidentiality.’”146 The Ethics 20/20 Commission further 
explained that the third category included the following subtopics: 
                                                                                                             
 141 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2002). 
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 143 News Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics 
Commission to Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing 
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 146 25 LAW. MAN. PROF’L CONDUCT 694 (Dec. 9, 2009). 
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“access to justice, competence, data security and confidentiality; 
and jurisdictional issues in lawyer discipline.”147 In its “Issues 
Paper” soliciting comments, the Ethics 20/20 Commission’s 
working group identified cloud computing and portable electronic 
devices as posing confidentiality issues.148 With respect to the use 
of portable electronic devices, the proposed areas of focus included 
protection of data stored on a portable electronic device in case it 
is lost or stolen and protection of information transmitted via the 
device.149 
The Ethics 20/20 Commission proposed amendments to Rules 
1.1, 1.4, and 1.6 at its May meeting.150 On August 6, 2012, the 
House of Delegates considered and approved the Ethics 20/20 
Commission’s proposals relating to technology and 
confidentiality.151 
As discussed above, ethics committees analyzing the 
propriety of lawyers using technology to communicate with their 
clients had consistently stated that Rule 1.1 implicitly required 
the lawyer to analyze and minimize the risks associated with 
using technology to communicate with a client.152 According to the 
Ethics 20/20 Commission, Rule 1.1’s requirement that lawyers 
“keep abreast of changes in the law” already implicitly required 
that lawyers be knowledgeable about changes in technology and 
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 148 Client Confidentiality Issues Paper, supra note 2; see also 26 LAW. MAN. PROF’L 
CONDUCT 586 (Sept. 29, 2010). 
 149 Client Confidentiality Issues Paper, supra note 2. 
 150 The Ethics 20/20 Commission’s proposed revisions to the Model Rules underwent 
minor changes throughout the comment period. For example, the earliest proposed 
revisions did not include any changes to Rule 1.4, and the amendment to Rule 1.1 did 
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lawyers and to choice of law provisions in lawyer/client agreements. 29 LAW. MAN. 
PROF’L CONDUCT 101 (Feb. 13, 2013). 
 152 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
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their impact on client confidentiality.153 It decided that this 
obligation needed to be explicit:154 “To maintain the requisite 
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in 
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks 
associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study 
and education and comply with all continuing legal education 
requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”155 
Interestingly, the amendment implies that a lawyer who does 
not use technology when technology would benefit the client does 
not provide competent representation.156 Indeed, in its Report to 
the House of Delegates, the Ethics 20/20 Commission observed 
that competent representation requires that a lawyer be able to 
use basic technology to send email or create an electronic 
document.157 By including the duty to keep abreast of the benefits 
of technology, the Commission suggests that failing to use 
technology could, in some situations, violate the lawyer’s ethical 
obligations. A situation in which such a violation could arise might 
involve the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the client and keep 
the client reasonably informed under Rule 1.4. Under some 
situations, the lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.1 to know of the 
benefits of technology and Rule 1.4 to communicate promptly 
might require the lawyer to use the most expedient mode of 
communication. Perhaps the lawyer who prefers to communicate 
by letter, telephone, or in person might find that the amended 
                                                                                                             
 153 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (Aug. 6, 
2012) [hereinafter ETHICS 20/20 REPORT], available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed
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 154 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8. 
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how to use email or create an electronic document.”). 
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Model Rules require the use of technology in order to 
communicate “promptly.”158 
The approved amendment to Rule 1.4 reflects the reality of 
the different ways that lawyers communicate with their clients. 
As discussed above, as part of Ethics 2000, the Comments to Rule 
1.4 were amended to explicitly state that lawyers should promptly 
return or acknowledge client telephone calls.159 In recognition that 
a lawyer’s mode of communication with the client is one of 
constant change, the Ethics 20/20 Commission amended the text 
to remove the specific reference to telephone calls. Rather, the 
amended text now reads, “A lawyer should promptly respond to or 
acknowledge client communications.”160 
Just like in 2002, the most significant changes were to Rule 
1.6. This time, however, the Ethics 20/20 Commission 
recommended, and the House of Delegates adopted, a change to 
the black letter law.161 Specifically, the amendment added a new 
subsection (c), which provides as follows: “A lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to 
the representation of a client.”162 
Although the Ethics 2000 Commission provided guidance on 
protecting confidentiality during the transmission of client 
information, that guidance did not include factors relating to the 
storage of the information.163 The Ethics 20/20 Commission 
significantly changed the guidance the Comments provide for 
lawyers in discharging this affirmative duty to protect confidential 
client information.164 The amendments to the Comments recognize 
                                                                                                             
 158 Another trap for the unwary lawyer relates to the speed with which the lawyer 
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that unauthorized access or disclosure can occur even despite the 
lawyer’s reasonable efforts to protect the information.165 Although 
the Comments do not prescribe strict rules for the lawyer to follow 
in deciding whether a technology threatens the client’s 
confidential information, it does provide a list of factors for the 
lawyer to consider.166 Specifically, the Comments provide as 
follows: 
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of 
the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if 
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing 
additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the 
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely 
affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making 
a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to 
use).167 
These factors, of course, sound similar to the concerns raised 
in ethics committee decisions from across the country. 
Even from its initial issues paper soliciting comments with 
respect to its work, the Ethics 20/20 Commission recognized the 
limitation of using amendments to the Model Rules as a vehicle 
for helping lawyers determine whether a particular use of 
technology comports with the lawyer’s ethical requirements.168 
That limitation results from the rapid pace at which technology 
changes.169 For that reason, the Commission asked the ABA 
                                                                                                             
 165 Id.; see also INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8 (“The Commission 
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Center for Professional Responsibility to design and maintain a 
web-site devoted to providing practitioners with current 
information relating to technology and ethical issues.170 The web-
site would provide the technology-specific guidance that an 
amendment to the Model Rules could not. 
The effect of these rules, of course, depends on whether they 
are adopted by state courts and bar associations.171 On January 
15, 2013, Delaware became the first state to adopt changes 
proposed by the Ethics 20/20 Commission.172   
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW STUDENTS AND NEW LAWYERS 
As the Model Rules now explicitly state, weighing the risks 
and benefits of technology is an ethical responsibility of all 
lawyers. All lawyers must think harder about how they use 
technology for client communications and must also monitor their 
clients’ use of technology to make sure that it does not jeopardize 
communication confidentiality. Traditional brick-and-mortar law 
firm lawyers perhaps have to analyze whether incorporating more 
technology into their practice would benefit their clients. More 
technologically-inclined lawyers have to consider whether their 
use of technology perhaps exposes their clients’ confidential 
information to an unacceptable risk of interception173 or fails to 
satisfy the lawyers’ duties to provide competent legal advice and 
                                                                                                             
 170 Id. (describing the proposed website as “a centralized user-friendly website with 
continuously updated and detailed information about confidentiality-related ethics 
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to communicate effectively. This evaluation of the benefits and 
risks of technology is perhaps most challenging for the current 
generation of law students and new lawyers, who are primarily 
part of the technologically-inclined Millennial Generation.174 
Therefore, this Article proposes that law professors, legal writing 
professors in particular, and lawyers who supervise new lawyers 
challenge law students and new lawyers to think critically about 
when and how they use technology to communicate confidential 
client information so that they are adequately prepared to 
represent their clients. 
A. Instruction about Use of Electronic Communications in Law 
Practice Is an Important Component of a Legal Writing 
Curriculum and New Lawyer Mentoring 
Though use of electronic communication became widespread 
among practitioners by the mid-1990s, drafting electronic 
communications was not a common component of the curriculum 
of legal writing classes even after the beginning of the 21st 
Century. For example, in 2006, the ABA Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar published the second edition 
of the Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs (the 
“Sourcebook”).175 Part II of the Sourcebook describes the types of 
documents that legal writing professors commonly taught at that 
time: the objective office memorandum, pretrial and trial briefs, 
and client letters.176 The Sourcebook does not include or reference 
                                                                                                             
 174 The “Millennial Generation” refers to those born after 1980. See PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., MILLENTIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 25 (2010), available at 
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-
change.pdf. Members of the Millennial Generation are also referred to as “digital 
natives,” which refers to their distinction as the first generation to grow up with 
technology. See Ellie Margolis & Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: 
Information Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117, 
120-21 (2012).The prevalence of technology has created a generation of young adults 
who predominantly use technology to obtain new information as well as to share 
information. Id. at 126. 
 175 ERIC B. EASTON ET AL., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 21 (Eric B. Easton et al. eds., 2d. ed. 
2006) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. 
 176 Id. 
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electronic communication in its list of commonly taught 
documents.177 
Because the increased use of technology had significantly 
changed the way in which even lawyers in brick-and-mortar law 
firms were advising their clients, scholars began advocating 
changes to the ways that law students are taught to communicate 
with their clients.178 For example, Professor Kristen Robbins-
Tiscione’s 2006 survey of graduates of the Georgetown University 
Law Center determined that practitioners are more likely to use 
email to advise their clients than the traditional office memoranda 
that most legal writing professors teach.179 According to Professor 
Robbins-Tiscione’s research, few practitioners write traditional 
office memoranda and instead advise their clients about the 
results of their research by “e-mail, telephone, face-to-face 
discussion, informal memorandum, or a letter, and in that order of 
preference.”180 She found that email was the “graduates’ method of 
choice for communicating with clients.”181 For that reason, 
Professor Robbins-Tiscione recommended that legal writing 
professors acknowledge the growing importance of electronic 
communication and incorporate it into the legal writing 
curriculum.182 
That the current generation of law students and new lawyers 
are part of the technologically savvy Millennial Generation does 
not lessen the need for instruction regarding electronic 
communication.183 For example, in a recent article, Professor 
Kendra Huard Fershee encourages law professors to include email 
                                                                                                             
 177 See id. 
 178 See generally Maria Perez Crist, Technology in the LRW Curriculum – High 
Tech, Low Tech, or No Tech, 5 LEGAL WRITING 93, 101-02 (1999) (“E-mail should be a 
part of every LRW curriculum.”); Anne Enquist & Laurel Oates, You’ve Sent Mail: Ten 
Tips to Take with You to Practice, 15 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 127 
(2007) (providing tips legal writing professors can provide students in last class 
regarding email communications when curriculum does not include email); Kristen 
Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, From Snail Mail to E-mail: The Traditional Legal 
Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32 (2008) (discussing 
increased use of email by practitioners). 
 179 Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 178, at 32. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 33, 41-43. 
 182 Id. at 34, 49. 
 183 Kendra Huard Fershee, The New Legal Writing: the Importance of Teaching Law 
Students How to Use e-mail Professionally, 71 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 10-14 (2012). 
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communication in their curriculum because although current law 
students are quite familiar with email,184 they most often do not 
have experience with professional email.185 Because most of that 
experience with email has been in social settings, which is 
necessarily less formal than professional email, law professors 
cannot assume from students’ familiarity with email that they 
know how to use it professionally.186 Specifically, the 
“rudimentary language usage” and lack of emphasis on proper 
punctuation, spelling, and grammar in social email are 
inappropriate for professional email.187 
Similarly, Professors Aliza Kaplan and Kathleen Darvil 
emphasize that the current generation of law students’ familiarity 
with technology and differences in learning style from prior 
generations necessitate a different approach to research 
instruction.188 Much like Professor Fershee, Professors Kaplan 
                                                                                                             
 184 See Ian Gallacher, “Who Are Those Guys?”: The Results of a Survey Studying the 
Information Literacy of Incoming Law Students, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 151, 173-75 (2007). 
Gallacher’s survey of the writing habits of incoming law students from seven schools in 
2006 documented the frequency with which that group communicated via email or 
other forms of electronic communication. Id. Based on the survey results, Professor 
Gallacher concluded that “electronic communication is thriving among incoming law 
students.” Id. at 173. According to the survey results, email, text messaging, and 
instant messaging were very common methods for electronic communication for the 
students. Id. at 173-74. 
 185 Fershee, supra note 183, at 14. Professor Fershee points out that email began its 
rise to widespread use when many of today’s law students were in elementary school. 
Id. at 11. For that reason, today’s law students had considerable more exposure to 
email than prior generations. See id. 
 186 Id. at 12-14. Other scholars have made a similar argument that current 
students’ frequent use of social media necessitates instruction (either through 
guidelines or classroom instruction) regarding the risks and benefits of its use. See, e.g., 
Anna P. Hemingway, Keeping it Real: Using Facebook Posts to Teach Professional 
Responsibility and Professionalism, 43 N.M. L REV. 43, 53-57 (2013); Kathleen Elliott 
Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just “Face” It, 
41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 376-82 (2010). 
 187 Fershee, supra note 183, at 12. 
 188 Aliza B. Kaplan & Kathleen Darvil, Think [and Practice] Like a Lawyer: Legal 
Research for the New Millennials, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 153, 154-56 
(2011); see also Margolis & Murray, supra note 174, at 26. In 2011, Professors Margolis 
and Murray conducted a survey of first year law students to determine their “research 
training, experience, and general research practices.” Id. at 133. They concluded that 
law students enter law school with “certain research competencies, confidences, and 
practices.” Id. at 152. Because incoming law students are accustomed to conducting 
online research in which almost any search produces some results, Professors Margolis 
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and Darvil emphasize that the current generation of law students 
is the first generation to have grown up using technology.189 That 
familiarity with technology, however, perhaps explains why some 
of the law students surveyed turned to non-legal Internet sources 
like Google or Wikipedia and seldom used print resources for their 
research.190 Thus, students’ familiarity with technology 
necessitates perhaps a different approach to instruction about its 
use, but does not vitiate the necessity of that instruction.191 
Finally, Professor Helia Garrido Hull has argued that 
common personality traits among members of the Millennial 
Generation and their frequent use of social media and electronic 
modes of communication necessitate additional professionalism 
training.192 As one example of the increased need for this training, 
she points to Millennials’ frequent use of instantaneous, public 
forms of electronic communication and evidence that indicates 
that they place a lower value on privacy than older generations.193 
For that reason, she argues that law schools should place more 
emphasis on training students about their ethical requirements of 
protecting client confidences during law school.194 
                                                                                                             
and Murray propose that legal research classes focus on helping students sift through 
and analyze the results of their searches, rather than finding the law. Id. at 152-56. 
 189 Kaplan, supra note 188, at 174-76. (“Millennials believe themselves to be 
technologically savvy and efficient multitaskers. They grew up using computers and 
relating to the world through technology.”). 
 190 Id. at 165-68. 
 191 Id. at 176 (“Due to the profound changes in technology and how Millennials 
learn, it is up to us as educators to rethink and reimagine how to teach legal 
research.”). 
 192 See generally Helia Garrido Hull, Legal Ethics for the Millennials: Avoiding the 
Compromise of Integrity, 80 UMKC L. REV. 271, 276 (2011) (“This article considers the 
need to provide additional training in ethics and professionalism, and argues that the 
current generation of law students are not receiving sufficient training under the 
current approach used in most law schools.”). 
 193 See id. at 277-78, 285. Professor Hull describes Millennials’ views on 
confidentiality as follows: “Millennials value confidentiality and privacy less than other 
age groups, in part, because information flow is virtually instantaneous and they 
generally believe that knowledge is meant to be shared not owned. As a result, 
Millennials are less likely to appreciate breaches of privacy than other age groups.” Id. 
at 277-78. This willingness to share private information publicly is perhaps best 
demonstrated in social media. The frequent “oversharing” of personal information on 
social media by law students demonstrates their lower expectations for personal 
privacy. See Vinson, supra note 186, at 376-82. 
 194 Id. at 285. 
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The most recent survey of legal writing professors 
demonstrates that legal writing professors have heeded the 
recommendations to include email assignments in their 
curriculum.195 Question 20 of the Association of Legal Writing 
Directors/Legal Writing Institute’s annual survey of legal writing 
professors asks “[w]hat writing assignments are assigned . . . in 
the required LRW program?”196 For the first time in 2012, the 
survey included “electronic (emails) memos” as a choice among 
other traditional writing assignments such as office memoranda, 
client letters, and appellate briefs.197 Of the 172 schools that 
responded to this question, 81 indicated that they assigned 
electronic memos.198 
The increased focus on electronic communication has not 
been limited to just law school legal writing classes. Rather, a 
search of bar journal articles and practitioner materials 
demonstrate an increased focus on electronic client 
communications and concern among practicing lawyers regarding 
email.199 These practitioner pieces discuss both the need for 
                                                                                                             
 195 In addition, many of the research and writing textbooks provide readings 
regarding electronic communication. See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL, A LAWYER 
WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 9-10 (Carolina Academic Press 2008); 
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 193-96 (Aspen 2d ed. 
2011); LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: 
ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 255-59 (Aspen 5th ed. 2010); NANCY L. SCHULTZ & 
LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 203-11 (Aspen 5th 
ed. 2010). Although some of these textbooks refer to the confidentiality concerns for 
electronic communication, their primary focus is on the professional appearance and 
content of the communication. 
 196 ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE 
ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 13 (2012) [hereinafter ALWD survey], available at 
http://lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2012Survey.pdf. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See, e.g., Jim Calloway, Email Issues for Lawyers Today, 83 OKLA. B.J. 1760 
(2012); Gerald Lebovits, E-mail Netiquette for Lawyers, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 2009, at 64; 
Donald R. Lundberg, Ready, Aim, Disclose: Understanding the Power of the Email 
‘Send’ Button in Your Law Practice, RES GESTAE, Mar. 2012, at 30; Janice MacAvoy et 
al., Think Twice Before You Hit the Send Button! Practical Considerations in the Use of 
Email, THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, Dec. 2008, at 45, available at www.ali-
cle.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.periodical&pub=PL; Marian C. Rice, Email 
Communications with Clients, LAW PRAC., Jan. 2013, at 14; Catherine Sanders Reach, 
Enjoy Email Responsibly, ARK. LAW., Summer 2009, at 30; Wayne Schiess, E-mail Like 
a Lawyer, 12 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 151 (2008); see also Peter Roberts, Protecting 
Client Data: 11 Steps to Take When Using Technology, LAW PRAC., Mar. 2010, at 48 
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electronic client communications to be professional in appearance 
and content and the confidentiality concerns surrounding 
electronic communications. 
Thus, there exists a recognized need for instruction regarding 
electronic communications. 
B. Legal Research and Writing Courses and New Lawyer 
Mentoring are Natural Fits for Instruction About the Decision 
to Use Electronic Communication 
Much of the conversation about the need to educate law 
students about electronic communication has involved instruction 
regarding the structure of electronic communication as well as the 
need for electronic communication to be professional in 
appearance and content. Although correct grammar, editing, 
formatting, and tone are among the necessary components of 
instruction regarding professional email,200 to prepare law 
students and new lawyers for the practice of law, that instruction 
also needs to put electronic communications in their ethical 
context. 
Creative legal writing professors have designed legal writing 
assignments that help prepare students to communicate the 
results of their research or advice in electronic form.201 These 
assignments require students to consider the appropriate content 
and organization for a professional email.202 Because the needs of 
a reader who is viewing an electronic communication on a 
smartphone, tablet, or laptop computer differ from the needs of 
the reader who is viewing a hard copy of the analysis, assignments 
                                                                                                             
(providing “list of the present requirements of competency for protecting client 
information when using technology”). 
 200 Fershee, supra note 183, at 15-18; see also Tracy Turner, E-Mail Etiquette in the 
Business World, 18 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 18, 18-23 (2009). 
Professor Turner’s “practical tips” on professional email relate primarily to the content 
of the email, but she also discusses situations in which practitioners should not use 
email: when the email includes “sensitive, confidential or confrontational information,” 
when the client prefers another form of communication, or when the email involves an 
urgent matter. Id. at 18-19. 
 201 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Incorporating Electronic Communication in the LRW 
Communication, PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING, Winter 2011, at 121 
(describing legal writing assignment that required students to communicate results of 
research and analysis in email to senior partner). 
 202 Id. 
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such as these are crucial to a well-rounded legal writing 
curriculum. 
This instruction, however, should be supplemented with 
discussions regarding the ethical implications of electronic 
communication.203 The ease and frequency with which the current 
generation of law students and new lawyers communicate 
electronically necessitates rather than vitiates the need for this 
discussion.204 Law students and new lawyers should be taught 
that the lawyer’s duties of confidentiality, competence, and 
communication sometimes preclude or alter the decision to 
communicate electronically. That the recent amendments to the 
Model Rules and recent ethics opinions obligate lawyers to be 
knowledgeable about the risks of technology and warn clients 
when their clients use technology in a manner that jeopardizes 
confidentiality demonstrates the necessity of this instruction.205 
To prepare law students and new lawyers to appreciate the 
significance of the decision to use technology, the instruction 
should include specific reference to the relevant provisions of the 
ethical rules and ethics opinions. 
Specifically, instruction and mentoring should focus on the 
ethical issues raised in the ethics committee opinions discussed 
herein and other related concerns:206 
                                                                                                             
 203 As discussed infra, other scholars have proposed that legal writing instruction 
include specific references to the ethical obligations that apply to the student’s work. 
Professor Melissa Weresh has developed a textbook that provides the relevant ethical 
rules and other readings for the assignments typically completed by students in a first 
year legal writing course. Her textbook includes a chapter on email communication 
includes some of the considerations that this Article proposes legal writing professors 
and supervising lawyers raise. See MELISSA H. WERESH, LEGAL WRITING: ETHICAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 15-37 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2009). 
 204 See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text. 
 205 See supra notes 112-20 and 142-172 and accompanying text. In a recent article, 
Professor Michael Green points out that California Ethics Opinion No. 2010-179, ABA 
Ethics Opinions No. 11-459, and the recently adopted amendments to Rule 1.1 are part 
of a trend of putting an additional burden on lawyers to be knowledgeable about the 
risks associated with technology, even when it is the client’s use of technology that 
jeopardizes the confidentiality. Green, supra note 121, at 356-57. Educating law 
students and new lawyers about the risks of using an electronic mode of 
communication for confidential client information will help them be better prepared to 
discharge this duty when early in their practice. 
 206 State privacy laws may also impact the lawyer’s decision of whether and how to 
use technology to communicate with the client. Comment 10 to Rule 1.6 provides that 
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 Using technology to communicate regarding extremely 
sensitive matters; 
 Using technology to communicate with the client who 
does not use technology effectively; 
 Using technology to communicate with a client who uses 
a device or system that third parties can access;207 
 Using technology carelessly, such as by not scrutinizing 
the recipient list208 or not checking the document 
carefully for metadata; 
 Using technology without understanding the service 
provider’s policies regarding confidentiality and data 
retention; 
 Using unsecure mobile devices209 or public Internet 
connections when communicating with a client or 
working on confidential client information; 
 Continuing to use technology to communicate with a 
client even when the electronic communication is not 
producing the information the lawyer needs in order to 
provide competent representation; 
                                                                                                             
these privacy rules are beyond the scope of the Model Rules, and they are also beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 207 A third party could potentially access stored email either because the third party 
has a relationship with the client and knows the password, the third party is an 
employer who owns the device or email account that the client is using to send or 
receive email, or the third party gains access to the device used to access the email or 
the password for the email account because of carelessness by the lawyer or client. See 
Hricik, supra note 9, at 469-70 (“If reasonable precautions are not taken to protect 
access to computers which can access the stored e-mail, then the information, even if 
safely transmitted over the Internet to the lawyer’s mailbox, can be misused.”). 
 208 See MacAvoy, supra note 199, at 46-48 (describing embarrassing consequences of 
misdirected or forwarded emails). 
 209 As of December 2012, 45% of Americans over the age of 18 own a smartphone, 
61% own a laptop computer, and 31% own a tablet computer. Trend Data (Adults), Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-
(Adults)/Device-Ownership.aspx. An almost equally high percentage of teens, who are 
future law students, own these devices. Trend Data (Teens), Pew Internet & American 
Life Project, available at http://www.pewInternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-
(Teens)/Teen-Gadget-Ownership.aspx. Specifically, 37% of teens own a smartphone, 
80% own a laptop computer, and 23% own a tablet computer. Id. 
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 Recognizing client expectations for the lawyer’s 
responsiveness for communications sent through an 
instantaneous technology like email;210 and 
 Evaluating risks associated with new or developing 
technologies or new risks of interception for established 
technologies.211 
Legal writing professors are specially situated to raise these 
issues with their students. In fact, some legal scholars have 
proposed for a number of years that one way to rectify the 
perceived lack of civility in legal practice is by beginning to 
educate students about professionalism and ethical requirements 
in the first year legal writing course.212 First, because the legal 
writing and research course is the foundational course for learning 
                                                                                                             
 210 See supra note 157. 
 211 The constant development of new technologies has at least two effects for 
lawyers. First, new technologies offer new ways to communicate with the client. 
Second, new technologies perhaps pose news risks of interception of established forms 
of electronic communication. 
 212 Donna Chin et al., One Response to the Decline of Civility in the Legal Profession: 
Teaching Professionalism in Legal Research and Writing, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 889, 896-
99 (1999); Melissa H. Weresh, Fostering a Respect for Our Students, Our Specialty, and 
the Legal Profession: Introducing Ethics and Professionalism into the Legal Writing 
Curriculum, 21 TOURO L. REV. 427, 427 (2005) (“I argue that we should promote this 
rich doctrinal material as an essential component of our curricula. We should not only 
introduce concepts of ethics and professionalism in class, but we should make these 
concepts a pervasive theme of our curriculum and pedagogy.”). Chin gave the nature of 
feedback that legal writing professors provide, the nature of the assignments that 
students complete, and the interaction between legal writing professors and their 
students as reasons why the legal writing course is well-suited for instruction on 
professionalism. Chin, supra, at 896-99; see also Julie A. Oseid, It Happened to Me: 
Sharing Personal Value Dilemmas to Teach Professionalism and Ethics, 12 LEGAL 
WRITING 105, 110-18 (2006) (proposing that legal writing classes include “value 
dilemmas” because of small size of class, teaching techniques, and practice experience 
of professor). More recently, Professor Anna Hemingway proposed that law professors 
use Facebook posts as a vehicle to teach professional responsibility and 
professionalism. Hemingway, supra note 186, at 53. She offers the first year “legal 
methods” or legal research and writing course as one possible place in the curriculum 
to offer this instruction. Id. at 54. She cites the legal writing professor’s ability to tap 
into the first year students’ eagerness to learn about the profession and the 
“unequivocal message . . . that professionalism is core to the study of law” as weighing 
in favor of not waiting until the second year professional responsibility course to 
provide this instruction. Id. She asserts that the smaller class size, increased 
faculty/student interaction, and nature of some of the work done in the course also 
make this instruction a natural fit in the legal writing course. Id. at 54-55. 
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to communicate with clients, colleagues, and the court, 
introducing the relevant ethical rules contemporaneously allows 
the students to put both the rules and the communication in 
context and therefore have a richer learning experience.213 Second, 
most first year law students arrive at law school excited to learn 
more about their chosen profession; incorporating ethics and 
professionalism into the first year legal writing class highlights its 
importance.214 Finally, the nature of the feedback and the 
individualized attention that legal writing professors give their 
students makes the legal writing classroom an appropriate venue 
for introducing instruction about ethics and professionalism.215 
That the legal writing curriculum is already packed full and 
that ethics is typically a required upper level course216 do not 
provide ample reason to avoid teaching law students that a 
lawyer’s professional obligations impact decisions regarding the 
use of technology in client communications. The ABA’s efforts to 
revise the Model Rules in the Ethics 2000 and Ethics 20/20 
Commissions to reflect the changes to legal practice due to 
advances in technology signal the significance technology will 
have on the practice of today’s law students and new lawyers.217 
Given the current generation of law students’ and new lawyers’ 
familiarity and comfort with technology for social uses and the 
prevalence of technology in modern legal practice, failing to teach 
                                                                                                             
 213 See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 175, at 36-38; see also Weresh, supra note 212, at 
436-39, 442-44. According to the SourceBook, ethical rules regarding competence, 
diligence, communication, meritorious claims and contentions, and candor toward the 
tribunal are especially relevant for legal writing courses because they relate directly to 
the skills taught in the course. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 175, at 36-38; see generally 
Kristen E. Murray, Legal Writing Missteps: Ethics and Professionalism in the First-
Year Legal Research and Writing Classroom, 20 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & 
WRITING 134 (2012) (describing exercise requiring first year legal writing students to 
identify errors in legal writing from media sources that had profound consequences for 
lawyers). 
 214 Weresh, supra note 212, at 439-41. 
 215 Chin, supra note 212, at 896-99. 
 216 Professor Weresh identifies an “already overburdened” curriculum and required 
upper-level courses devoted to ethics and professionalism as common objections to 
incorporating ethics and professionalism into the first year legal writing class 
curriculum. Weresh, supra note 212, at 429-32; see also Hemingway, supra note 186, at 
55-56. Although she does not dispute the legitimacy of these concerns, she argues that 
the benefits to including the material outweigh them. Weresh, supra note 210, at 430-
32. 
 217 See supra notes 135-72 and accompanying text. 
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that technology is not always the best choice and that a lawyer 
needs to use technology differently when communicating with 
clients could lead to ethical problems. 
My proposal is not that legal writing professors assume the 
burden of teaching all the nuances of ethics and professionalism to 
their students. Most law schools award two credit hours for each 
of the two semesters of the legal writing course,218 which is barely 
enough time to teach the fundamentals of legal writing. Rather, 
because legal writing professors are rightly incorporating 
assignments that require students to prepare electronic 
communications,219 that instruction is incomplete unless it 
includes a discussion of the threshold questions of when and how 
students should use that form of communication.220 
Raising this threshold question does not necessarily require 
creating additional assignments. As described above, many legal 
writing professors already include an email assignment in their 
curriculum.221 An assignment in which the student has to 
communicate research results to the client provides an excellent 
opportunity to instruct students about the ethical concerns with 
electronic communication as well as content, tone, and 
professionalism. Weaving ethical considerations into the 
assignment can be as simple as adding facts involving an associate 
lawyer who has been asked to convey the advice to the client but 
                                                                                                             
 218 ALWD survey, supra note 196, at 7. According to the 2012 survey, 90 and 103 
schools award two credit hours for the fall and spring semesters, respectively. Id. The 
trend seems to be toward awarding more credit hours: 72 and 66 schools award two 
credit hours for the fall and spring semesters, respectively. Id. 
 219 Although the current trend is to include instruction about email in the legal 
writing course, my proposal is intentionally broader than just email. As Professor 
Hemingway points out in her article about the use of Facebook posts, a professor who 
incorporates technology into the classroom must adapt to changes in technology. 
Hemingway, supra note 186, at 73-76. She uses email as an example. Id. at 73-74. 
Although email is the current technology of choice for legal writing assignments, 
younger generations prefer different technologies, such as texting. My proposal is that 
regardless of the technology that a professor chooses for an assignment, the professor 
should also discuss with the students how to use that technology in a way that 
comports with a lawyer’s ethical obligations. 
 220 This proposal is consistent with Professor Weresh’s approach to integrating 
ethics and professionalism into the legal writing curriculum. See Weresh, supra note 
212, at 461. She describes one aspect of that integration as follows: “As we introduce 
new forms of writing, we should bring our students’ attention to the attendant ethical 
and professional obligations associated with the production of that document.” Id. 
 221 See supra note 196. 
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the lawyer is out of town for a family trip, a client who uses an 
email address that seems to belong to an employer, or a 
potentially unfavorable result for the client. The instructions to 
the student regarding how to communicate the advice should be 
left intentionally vague, except for making clear the need for some 
written documentation of the advice in the file that the client also 
receives. The student would then have to sift through the choices 
– phone call with follow up letter, letter sent through the postal 
service or a courier, email, and so forth. After the students have 
completed the assignment, the professor can engage the class in a 
discussion about the choices each student made regarding how to 
communicate the advice and how the ethical requirements 
impacted that decision. 
While critical, this instruction during the first year of law 
school is the starting point for ensuring that future lawyers are 
prepared to use technology for client communications in a way 
that is consistent with their ethical obligations. Rather, the 
instruction needs to continue through the law students’ early 
years as a practicing lawyer. More experienced lawyers charged 
with the responsibility of mentoring new lawyers need to 
recognize the Millennial’s probable preference for technology and 
electronic communication and temper it with instruction 
regarding the risks it can pose. 
CONCLUSION 
Technology has forever changed the way that lawyers 
practice law. Although today’s law students and new lawyers are a 
product of a technologically advanced society, the experience of 
using that technology as a professional subject to ethical 
requirements is new. To adequately prepare their students and 
mentees to use technology as an ethical professional when their 
communication involves a client or client information, legal 
writing professors and supervising lawyers need to provide 
instruction on both the content of electronic communication as 
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